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I. INTRODUCTION
Those inside the Chicago organized crime "Outfit"' called boss
Anthony Accardo, whose weapon of choice was a baseball bat, "Joe
Batters."2 As the reputed heir to Al Capone's organized crime syndi-
cate in Chicago,3 Accardo was also known by the Outfit's term for
president-"The Enforcer."4 And after he caught a 400-pound tuna
off the coast of Florida in the early 1950s, the press began to call
Accardo "Big Tuna."5 No matter what other people called him, law-
enforcement officials called him a criminal. They claimed that during
his long career Accardo was responsible for numerous crimes, includ-
ing murder, while supervising the Outfit's vast array of illegal
activities.6
Until his death of natural causes7 in May, 1992, at the age of 86,
Accardo steadfastly maintained that he was merely a well-to-do busi-
1. Lee A. Daniels, Anthony Accardo, Long a Figure in Mob World, Dies in Bed at 86,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at B7.
2. Id.
3. Hoodlum of Distinction, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1958, at 16.
4. OVID DEMARIS, CAPTIVE CITY 5 (1969).
5. Daniels, supra note I.
6. Id. A member of "the Chicago Crime Commission, a private watchdog group, said
Mr. Accardo's long life stemmed from his rule that organized crime in Chicago stay away
from drug trafficking." Id. Another source indicated that the reason why the "Outfit"
suffered much less gangland-style violence than New York organized crime was that various
New York crime families feuded among themselves, but the Chicago "Outfit" remained a
single, unified family under Accardo. See Edward Walsh, Letter from the Big Tuna's Home
Town, WASH. POST, May 31, 1992, at A6.
7. Walsh, supra note 6.
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nessman.' He also boasted that, despite many encounters with police,
he "never spent a night in jail."9 His record of untouchability
appeared to be in jeopardy in 1982, when he and fifteen co-defendants
stood trial on charges of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Criminal
Organizations) conspiracy.' 0  The charges stemmed from alleged
activities involving kickbacks from a labor union insurance pro-
gram."I Once again, Accardo emerged victorious-the jury acquitted
him of all charges.
He pushed his luck too far by claiming a deduction from his
income taxes for the legal fees he had incurred in his successful
defense against the racketeering charge. Under some circumstances,
such a deduction would be allowable, but in Accardo's case, the IRS
denied the deduction.' 2 The United States Tax Court upheld the
denial,' 3 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 4
The Tax Court relied on a standard theory of tax law in denying
the deduction, and the Seventh Circuit added a justification generated
by RICO case law. In their decisions, both courts carefully followed
established precedent. But with a more expansive reading of the pre-
cedent, either court could have allowed Accardo's tax deduction.
Such a concession would have required more generosity than either
court apparently felt toward this particular taxpayer. To explain why
both courts reached negative decisions, and how they could have done
just the opposite, this Note first explores Accardo's criminal history
and how that history would quite naturally dissuade any court from
showing generosity in Accardo's case. Next, the Note examines the
circumstances under which a tax deduction for legal expenses might
be permitted, as well as the two arguments used by the courts to deny
Accardo's deduction. This Note concludes that, although both the
Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit applied standard law, these courts'
decisions may have had as much to do with the identity of the tax-
payer as they had to do with legal theories. Anthony Accardo was
8. Daniels, supra note 1.
9. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, MIAMI NEWS, June 19, 1982, at 4A.
However, Accardo's New York Times obituary suggests otherwise. "[O]n Lincoln's birthday
in 1945, driving through downtown Chicago, [Accardo] was picked up for questioning in a
gambling case. Because the courts were closed for the holiday, Mr. Accardo had to remain in
jail until the next day." Daniels, supra, note 1.
10. The relevant portion of the RICO statute applied to these co-defendants provides that
it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the]
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
11. Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 1991).
12. See infra part V.
13. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96 (1990).
14. Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1991).
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not a sympathetic plaintiff, and after many years of being lenient, the
courts may have decided that enough was enough.
II. WHO WAS ANTHONY J. ACCARDO?
Born in 1906 in Chicago, 5 Anthony Joseph Accardo supposedly
started his mob career as Al Capone's bodyguard and chauffeur,16 and
was allegedly one of the triggermen in the St. Valentine's Day Massa-
cre in 1929, when the Capone gang eliminated the rival gang of Bugs
Moran.' 7 Accardo rose rapidly in the ranks of Capone's organiza-
tion.18 After the long and bloody battle for supremacy in Chicago-
area organized crime-known as the War of Sicilian Succession-
between the group led by Al Capone and another group led by the
Genna brothers, the Capone group eventually emerged victorious. 19
Among the top Capone officers were Frank Nitti, Sam Giancana, and
Anthony Accardo.2 °
When Capone went to prison for income tax evasion in 1932,
Accardo reportedly became second in command to Capone's heir,
Paul "The Waiter" Ricca.2 When Ricca was imprisoned in 1943,
Accardo became "chief."' 22 He maintained that post until 1956, when
he willingly stepped down in favor of Sam Giancana, because the
Internal Revenue Service was becoming "annoyingly curious" about
Accardo's sources of income.23
Accardo's lengthy criminal record listed more than twenty-seven
arrests, including charges of carrying concealed weapons, gambling,
extortion, kidnapping, and murder.24 The Chicago Crime Commis-
sion blacklisted him as one of twenty-eight Public Enemies in 1931,25
and he was considered "one of the top mafiosi in the nation. ' 26 When
Accardo appeared in 1951 before the Senate Special Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime, he refused to divulge anything but his
name and thereby incurred a citation of contempt of Congress, which
was later dropped.27 In a 1958 appearance before the Senate Select
15. Hoodlum of Distinction, supra note 3.
16. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, supra note 9.
17. WILLIAM F. ROEMER, JR., ROEMER: MAN AGAINST THE MOB 1-2 (1989).
18. See id. at 2.
19. AUGUST BEQUAI, ORGANIZED CRIME: THE FIFTH ESTATE 35 (1979).
20. Id.
21. Hoodlum of Distinction, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. DEMARIS, supra note 4, at 5.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 323.
27. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, supra note 9.
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Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field, Accardo invoked Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination nearly 150 times.28
Until his most recent tax problems, Accardo enjoyed a remarka-
bly successful relationship with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In 1960, for example, he was convicted by a jury of making false state-
ments on his income tax return and sentenced to six years in prison
and a $15,000 fine. 29 But on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
conviction, citing prejudicial newspaper publicity during the trial.30
On remand, Accardo was acquitted of the falsification charges. 31
Another example of the Seventh Circuit's favorable treatment of
Accardo occurred in 1978, when his home in River Forest, Illinois
was burglarized. 32 Accardo never reported the burglary to the police,
but several people described by the government as "known bur-
glars"3 3 began turning up dead, with wounds apparently inflicted by
ice picks. 34 The Department of Justice and the FBI obtained a war-
rant to search Accardo's home for evidence related to the disappear-
ance of Accardo's handyman, who had reported the burglary to
Accardo and who had also been a witness before a grand jury investi-
gating Accardo.35 During the search, FBI agents seized $275,000 in
cash found in a basement vault in Accardo's home.36 But reasoning
that the cash had no nexus to an on-going criminal proceeding, the
Seventh Circuit ordered the cash returned to Accardo.37 No charges
were ever filed in the ice pick murders of the suspected burglars. 38
III. THE RICO CHARGE AND THE TAX DEDUCTION
Organized crime has historically been heavily implicated in ille-
gal activities involving labor unions, including the Laborers Interna-
28. US. Jury Acquits Reputed Crime Figure in Union Embezzling Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1982, at 8.
29. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, supra note 9; United States v. Accardo,
298 F.2d 133, 134 (7th Cir. 1962).
30. Accardo, 298 F.2d at 139.
31. ROEMER, supra note 17, at 94. FBI agents suggested that two of the judges on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals might have been bribed ("susceptible to an approach") in
this case. See id.
32. United States v. 1407 Ashland Avenue, 603 F.2d 1231, 1232 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 1232.
34. Art Petacque & Phillip J. O'Connor, Mob's "Cops" Hunt Hit Men, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1988, at 36, microformed on NewsBank Vol. XIX Feb. 1988 LAW 15:G2 (NewsBank,
Inc.).
35. 1407 Ashland Avenue, 603 F.2d at 1233.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1234.
38. See Petacque & O'Connor, supra note 34.
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tional Union of North America (LIUNA), which represents
thousands of unskilled and semiskilled laborers in the construction
industry.39 Within the LIUNA, organized crime has reportedly used
its influence to obtain workers' benefit funds, provide no-show jobs for
members involved in organized crime, pay the personal expenses of
union officials, gain access to the political process, and manipulate the
construction market.'
In 1981, a federal grand jury in Florida indicted Alfred Pilotto,
president of the union's Chicago local and a "territorial boss" of Chi-
cago organized crime,4" along with fifteen co-defendants, and charged
them with conspiracy to violate RICO laws.42 One of Pilotto's co-
defendants was Anthony Accardo. It looked as if the United States
government had finally found a way to reel in "Big Tuna."
The indictment charged the defendants with racketeering activi-
ties against local LIUNA health and welfare funds, activities that
consisted of setting up insurance companies and inducing the LIUNA
locals to funnel business to them. 3 The conspirators then looted the
pool of assets generated by the high insurance premiums charged by
the union." The Justice Department asserted that fifteen cents of
every dollar paid by LIUNA members "just disappeared."45
The indictment alleged that the defendants unlawfully conspired
to receive and make payments concerning LIUNA's employee welfare
benefit plans.46 It further maintained that Accardo's role in the con-
spiracy was to "agree to and support the operation of a kickback
scheme,"47 and that the insurance business of LIUNA "would be con-
trolled by 'the family' with ... Accardo controlling the midwestern
United States." '48
Included in the indictment were allegations of forfeiture as
authorized by RICO.4 9 The allegations read:
39. US. Jury Acquits Reputed Crime Figure in Union Embezzling Trial, supra note 28.
40. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME,
BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS 153 (1986).
41. Id. at 151.
42. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1497 (1lth Cir. 1986).
43. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 40, at 161.
44. Id.
45. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, supra note 9.
46. Indictment at 7, United States v. Accardo, No. 81-230-CR-ALH (S.D. Fla. filed June
3, 1981).
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id. at 18-19. The RICO statute provides that anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. § 1962,
the substantive portion of RICO:
shall forfeit to the United States ... (1) any interest the person has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962[, and] (2) any (A) interest in; (B) security
1993] 1065
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The interests of the defendants subject to forfeiture to the United
States include any and all proceeds of the pattern of racketeering
alleged in Count One and any and all interests, securities, claims,
and property and contractual rights acquired through the use of
these proceeds, including $2,064,066.32 paid and received as kick-
backs as set forth in [the indictment].5°
Finally, the indictment contended that "[t]he defendants are jointly
and severally liable to the United States for this forfeiture."'"
Five of the defendants' cases were severed; eleven went to trial
and eight defendants were convicted and sentenced.52 Three walked
out of the courtroom acquitted-one of them was Anthony
Accardo. 53
It cost him, though; Accardo's legal expenses topped $224,500. 54
Subsequently, he claimed the expense as a deduction on his income
tax returns for 1981 and 1982. He deducted legal fees of $17,500 and
$207,000 respectively, which were incurred in defending against the
RICO charge.55 Accardo relied on I.R.C. § 212(2), which permits
deductions of funds expended "for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property" in the course of business.5 6 Accardo con-
tended he had incurred the legal fees to protect his assets (i.e., several
certificates of deposit totaling over $1.5 million) from the joint and
several forfeiture liability he faced.57
of; (C) claim against; or property or contractual right of any kind affording a
source of influence over; any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
50. Indictment at 18.
51. Id.
52. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1497. The convictions were affirmed on
appeal. Id. at 1519. Two days before the trial began, however, Defendant Pilotto narrowly
escaped death in a "mob hit" on a Chicago area golf course. United States v. Guzzino, 810
F.2d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 1987). The murder attempt was bungled so badly that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the convictions of the would-be hit men, wrote: "Were this
attempted murder case not so serious, a recitation of some of its facts might suggest a Marx
Brothers skit instead of a relationship to organized crime." Id. at 689.
53. Jury Acquitted Accardo Right from the Start, supra note 9. One of the jurors at that
trial later disclosed that the decision to acquit Accardo had been made on the first of the jury's
ten days of deliberation. Id.
54. Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96, 98 (1990).
56. I.R.C. § 212(2) (West 1992).
57. Accardo, 94 T.C. at 98-99.
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IV. TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR EXPENSES ARISING FROM
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
The federal income tax system, in theory, pays no attention to
whether income and deductions are generated through legal or illegal
activities.5" The tax is a "tax on net income, not a sanction against
wrongdoing. '"59 In fact, during the Senate debate in 1913 on the bill
that ultimately became the income tax law, amendments that would
have limited deductions to those incurred in a lawful trade or business
were rejected.6' So, in theory, a taxpayer must report illegal as well as
legal income, and may deduct expenses incurred in obtaining illegal as
well as legal income.
However, this general theory of indifference to illegality in the
tax law has not always held true in practice. In fact, until 1966, a tax
deduction for attorney's fees incurred in an unsuccessful defense
against criminal charges was disallowed for reasons of public policy. 6'
Such deductions were thought to frustrate government attempts to
stop illegal action by giving a form of subsidy to the offender.62
This changed in a landmark case, Commissioner v. Tellier,63
where the United States Supreme Court established that public policy
no longer precluded a tax deduction for legal expenses incurred in an
unsuccessful criminal defense. The taxpayer in Tellier claimed a tax
deduction as a business expense for legal fees incurred in his unsuc-
cessful defense against securities and mail fraud charges. 6 The Court
found it was the taxpayer's constitutional right to employ a lawyer to
help in his defense. "No public policy is offended when a man faced
with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in his
defense."165 Thus, Tellier established that if a tax deduction for legal
expenses were to be disallowed, it would have to be for reasons other
than public policy.
Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) outlawed tax
deductions for bribes to government officials or any illegal bribes or
kickbacks, 66 fines and similar penalties, 67 and treble damages for vio-
58. MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 70 (3d ed.
1988).
59. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
60. Id. at 691.
61. Daniel I. Labowitz, Comment, Deductibility of Legal Expenses, 33 ALB. L. REV. 123,
127 (1968).
62. Id. at 127.
63. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
64. Id. at 688-89.
65. Id. at 694.
66. I.R.C. § 162(c) (1988).
67. Id. § 162(0.
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lation of antitrust laws.68 Similarly, the I.R.C. today prohibits any
deductions for expenses incurred in trafficking in illegal drugs.69
Unlike the I.R.C.'s provision for deductibility of medical and
dental expenses, 70 there is no specific provision regarding the deduct-
ibility of legal fees. There are only two ways in which a taxpayer may
justify a deduction for legal expenses. First, under I.R.C. § 162, legal
expenses may be deductible if they are "ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business." 7' That is, the legal expenses are deductible if they
arise from the trade or business from which the taxpayer earns her
income.
Second, if the taxpayer's legal expenses are incurred in some
income-producing way that is not her primary trade or business, for
example in stock ownership or rental real estate, she may be able to
deduct those expenses under § 212. That section allows deductions
for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year (1) for the production or collection of income; (2) for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or (3) in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax."' 72 Unlike medical expenses, which
are deductible although purely personal, legal expenses incurred as a
personal expense are not deductible;73 they must arise from some
profit-seeking activity.
When Anthony Accardo claimed a tax deduction for legal
expenses incurred in his defense against the RICO claim, he did not
attempt to use § 162, which would have required him to show that the
expenses were incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
"[TIndeed," sniffed the Seventh Circuit, "we have no idea what his
business is because [Accardo] refused to answer the [IRS'] interro-
gatory concerning his occupation, citing the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. ' 74 For Accardo to claim that his legal
expenses were incurred in carrying on a trade or business would be
tantamount to an admission of guilt under the racketeering charge.
Instead, Accardo claimed a deduction under § 212, arguing that
his legal fees were incurred to manage, conserve, or maintain income-
producing property within the meaning of § 212(2). Accardo's argu-
68. Id. § 162(g).
69. Id. § 280E.
70. Id. § 213.
71. Id. § 162(a).
72. I.R.C. § 212 (West 1992).
73. See I.R.C. § 262 (1988).
74. Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1991).
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ment was this: if he had been convicted of the RICO charge, he would
have faced joint and several liability for forfeiture of over $2 million.75
Accardo listed among his assets three certificates of deposit of
$500,000 each, the interest from which provided his income.7 6 He
argued that a RICO conviction would have meant forfeiture of the
certificates of deposit, thus depriving him of income-producing prop-
erty." Therefore, he reasoned, the legal expenses had been incurred
to protect that income-producing property, and should have been
deductible under § 212(2).7"
V. THE TAX COURT'S "ORIGIN OF THE CLAIM" THEORY
The Tax Court rejected Accardo's argument, and instead agreed
with the IRS that Accardo's legal fees were a non-deductible personal
expense.79 Distinguishing legal expenses deductible as business or
profit-seeking expenses under § 162 or § 212 from non-deductible per-
sonal legal expenses has long been an unclear area of tax law. The
Tax Court's decision in Accardo's case reflects that lack of clarity.
Kornhauser v. United States"° was the first Supreme Court case
dealing with the question whether legal expenses incurred in a lawsuit
can be a deductible profit-seeking expense. The taxpayer successfully
defended a claim by a former business partner that fees paid to the
taxpayer were for services rendered during the existence of a partner-
ship. The Court held that the expenses of defending that lawsuit were
deductible, even though the taxpayer was no longer a partner in the
business at the time of the suit.81 The Court ruled that "where a suit
or action against a taxpayer is directly connected with, or ... proxi-
mately resulted from, his business, the expense incurred is a business
expense."8 2
The "directly-connected" test of Kornhauser was modified in
Lykes v. United States,83 where a taxpayer had given gifts of stock to
his wife and children and had paid what he thought was the appropri-
ate amount of gift tax.84 When the IRS notified him of a tax defi-
ciency, the taxpayer, through his attorney, contested the ruling. The
75. Id. at 447.
76. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96, 98 (1990).
77. Accardo, 942 F.2d at 446.
78. Id. at 448.
79. Accardo, 94 T.C. at 100.
80. 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
83. 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
84. Id. at 119.
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taxpayer later claimed a tax deduction for his attorney's fees, assert-
ing that if he had to pay the increased gift tax, he would have to
liquidate his stock holdings to do so. Therefore, he argued, the attor-
ney's fees were incurred to maintain the income-producing stock.85
The Court denied the deduction on the ground that, although the
taxpayer might have suffered the consequence of a loss to his income-
producing property, the legal expenses had their origins in a lronal,
and therefore non-deductible, transaction (i.e., the taxpayer's gifts). 6
Thus, the Court adopted the origins test for distinguishing business
from personal expenses.8 7 Under the origins test, if the origins of the
expense are for business or profit-seeking activity, the expense is tax-
deductible. However, if the origins are personal, like those of the tax-
payer in Lykes, the deduction will be denied, despite the fact that the
consequences of the claim might have a substantial effect on the tax-
payer's business or other profit-seeking activity. 8
In the same year, however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reached a different result in Baer v. Commissioner,89 where the
court allowed a deduction for legal fees incurred in arranging a
divorce property settlement, permitting the taxpayer to retain a con-
trolling stock interest in a corporation. The court held that the imme-
diate purpose of the legal fees was preservation of income-producing
property: the taxpayer had to retain his stock interest to preserve his
position as president of the corporation, as well as to continue receiv-
ing his dividend income. If he had to pay the lump-sum alimony his
wife was seeking, he would have to sell the stock and thus lose his
salary and dividends.9"
Had the court applied the origins test as in Lykes, it might have
found the origins of this taxpayer's legal expenses to lie in the divorce
property settlement-a personal expense. Instead, the Baer court
ruled it was the consequences of the litigation that made the tax
deduction allowable-precisely the conclusion rejected in Lykes.9
In United States v. Gilmore,92 the U.S. Supreme Court attempted
to reconcile the conflicting approaches to distinguishing business from
personal legal expenses. Gilmore's legal expenses had, like Baer's,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 124.
87. Douglas P. Krause, Note, The Deductibility of Legal Expenses, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
392, 394 (1982).
88. Id. at 394-95.
89. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
90. Id. at 649-50.
91. Krause, supra note 87, at 394.
92. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
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been incurred in divorce litigation contesting his wife's claims to his
stock interest in three corporations. Because the taxpayer held a con-
trolling interest in the corporations, he was able to maintain the posi-
tion of president and principal managing officer of each company,
earning substantial dividends and salaries. 93 If his wife's claim were
successful, the consequences would be to place the husband's liveli-
hood in jeopardy 94 -a situation very much like that in Baer.
But in Gilmore, the Court rejected the analysis used by the
Eighth Circuit in Baer. The Court denied Gilmore's deduction of
legal fees, reasoning that the wife's claims stemmed from the personal
marital relationship and not from any profit-seeking activity.95 Thus,
the Court returned to the origins test of Lykes, concluding that "the
origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense
was incurred ... is the controlling basic test of whether the expense
was 'business' or 'personal.' "96
The Gilmore Court noted that the consequences test of Baer was
inequitable, in that it would make deductibility dependent on the tax-
payer's ability to pay the claim against him out of non-income-pro-
ducing property.97 If payment of the legal expenses required the
taxpayer to liquidate income-producing property, the consequences
test would render those legal expenses tax deductible. But if the claim
could be paid from non-income-producing assets, the consequences
test would yield the opposite result. The Court termed this "capri-
cious," and concluded that the origins test would avoid such "unequal
treatment." 98 The origins test has been broadly applied since Gilmore
in distinguishing business from personal expenses. 99 However, per-
haps because the Gilmore Court did not specify that the origins test
should be the exclusive method for distinguishing business from per-
sonal expenses, several courts of appeals have decided cases using
what appears to be the consequences test.
For example, in Dolese v. United States," an unusual divorce
petition named as party defendants three companies wholly owned by
the husband. The petition accused the husband of threatening to
deplete and dissipate the assets of the companies to deprive the wife of
her rights. The companies sought to deduct their share of the legal
93. Id. at 40-41.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 44.
96. Id. at 49.
97. Id. at 48.
98. Id.
99. Krause, supra note 87, at 396.
100. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979).
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and other expenses paid in the course of the litigation.'0 '
Dolese presented a "reverse Gilmore": whereas in Gilmore the
suit was a divorce against the husband, with the potential effect of
depleting the husband's corporate assets, in Dolese a portion of the
suit was against the corporation to compel preservation of the corpo-
rate assets, with the potential effect of increasing the wife's property
settlement under the divorce. The Dolese court ruled that "most of
the expenditures here arose directly out of the divorce action,"' 2 a
circumstance that made the expenditures non-deductible in Gilmore.
Nevertheless, in Dolese, the Tenth Circuit found that the expenses
were deductible to the extent they were incurred in connection with
the profit-making activities of the corporate taxpayer. 103 Thus, even
though the claim originated in a divorce action, the court found that
the business consequences of the litigation justified the tax deduction.
The Fourth Circuit also used a consequences test in Kopp's Co. v.
United States,"'° where a corporation attempted to deduct legal
expenses arising out of an automobile accident that occurred when
the principal shareholder's son was driving his father's company car
for personal reasons. 05 The court reasoned that, because the com-
pany was directly exposed to the risk of a judgment which amounted
to more than sixteen times the company's book value, and because the
company's bank and major suppliers had frozen its credit lines in view
of the possible judgment, the company's expenses incurred in defend-
ing itself constituted a business expense. 10 6 The court allowed the
company's deduction of legal fees even though the claim arose from a
non-business automobile accident and only the consequences, not the
origin, of the claim were business-related.
Similarly, in Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. United States, °7 a
corporate employer paid a settlement to one employee who had been
assaulted by another employee. That payment was held deductible as
an expense of litigation. 108 Although the case had been settled out of
court, the assaulted employee had intended to name the corporation
as a party defendant in his litigation. 0 9 The U.S. Claims Court, spe-
cifically distinguishing Gilmore, pointed to "the direct exposure to the
101. Id. at 1149.
102. Id. at 1151.
103. Id. at 1151-52.
104. 636 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 60.
106. Id. at 60-61.
107. 6 C1. Ct. 422 (1984).
108. Id. at 432.
109. Id. at 425-427.
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risk of a monetary judgment." "o Although the claim originated from
a personal confrontation between two employees, the possible conse-
quence of the company's liability was sufficient to render its legal
expenses deductible. 1
In Accardo's case, the Tax Court relied on the origins test to find
that his expenditure for legal fees was a non-deductible, purely per-
sonal expense. Accardo's claim, the Tax Court held, "arose in con-
nection with [his] alleged racketeering activities, rather than in
connection with the certificates of deposit.... Forfeiture of the certifi-
cates of deposit.., was merely a possible consequence of a failure to
defeat the claim.""' 2 The Tax Court determined that the origin of
Accardo's claim was the RICO charge. If Accardo had been found
guilty of racketeering, he might indeed have had to forfeit the certifi-
cates of deposit. But, the court held, that possible forfeiture was not
the origin of Accardo's claim but merely a possible consequence of a
conviction. " 13
The Tax Court's conclusion could be challenged on two grounds.
First, the origins test was not the only method the court might have
used to determine whether Accardo's legal expenses were deductible.
Instead, the Tax Court might have followed the example of the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits and the U.S. Claims Court" 4 and con-
cluded that the consequences of the RICO charge against Accardo
would be the loss of income-producing property. The certificates of
deposit were directly connected to the RICO charge, as required by
the broad holding of Kornhauser.
Alternatively, because the origins test provides no guidance for
characterizing the origin of a claim that involves both personal and
business elements, the Tax Court arguably was insufficiently specific
in its conclusion that the origin of Accardo's claim was his alleged
racketeering activities. In a criminal action such as this, the true "ori-
gin" of the claim is logically the indictment."5 In this case, the final
110. Id. at 431.
111. Id.
112. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96, 100 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
115. In another case, the Tax Court ruled that the origins test "does not contemplate a
mechanical search for the first in the chain of events which led to the litigation." Boagni v.
United States, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973) (footnote omitted). That might cast doubt on the use of
the indictment as the origin of Accardo's claim. However, the Tax Court continued,
"[c]onsideration must be given to the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the
litigation, the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were expended,
the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the controversy." Id. That
enlarged view is easily broad enough to encompass the indictment as part of the origin of
Accardo's claim.
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five paragraphs of the indictment specifically seek a forfeiture judg-
ment of over $2 million, for which the defendants would be jointly
and severally liable.' 16 In other words, the forfeiture threat was very
much part of the origin of Accardo's tax claim. Had he been found
guilty (as eight of his co-defendants were), he would have been
required to satisfy a substantial portion of that judgment (as eight of
his co-defendants did).
The fact that the indictment did not specifically identify
Accardo's certificates of deposit as forfeitable property is not mean-
ingful. Of course, if the indictment had specified the certificates as
forfeitable property, Accardo's tax case would have been very differ-
ent because the connection of the legal expenses to the certificates
would then have been undeniable. But because these defendants were
jointly and severally liable for the forfeiture, the effect on the certifi-
cates was the same as if the indictment had identified them as forfeita-
ble property. The Government was claiming over $2 million from
these defendants, and did not specify where they would be expected to
get it. For Accardo, a guilty verdict surely would have meant loss of
his certificates of deposit.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in this case inadvertently points
out the illogical result of the origins test as applied to Accardo.
According to the court, Accardo's less fortunate co-defendants who
were convicted of the RICO charge were able to take a business
deduction for their legal fees. That is, because of their convictions,
those co-defendants were deemed to be in the "business" of racketeer-
ing. They would therefore be entitled to a tax deduction for legal fees
incurred as part of that business.1 7 Accardo, however, was acquitted
of the racketeering charge; therefore, he was found not to be in the
"business" of racketeering and thus, could not claim a business
deduction for his legal fees.'""
But all of the co-defendants were indicted under the same indict-
ment; therefore, all had the same "origin of claim." If the conse-
quences of the claim are irrelevant, as the Tax Court maintained, and
all that matters is the origin, it should be correspondingly irrelevant
that three co-defendants were eventually found not guilty (and there-
fore entitled to no business deduction) while eight were convicted
(and therefore entitled to the business deduction). By differentiating
the tax treatment of those defendants who were convicted from the
116. Indictment at 18-19, United States v. Accardo, No. 81-230-CR-ALH (S.D. Fla. filed
June 3, 1981).
117. Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 448.
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tax treatment of those who were acquitted, the court here is either
ignoring the origins test and looking at the consequences while claim-
ing to do the opposite, or is inadvertently revealing the gross inade-
quacy of the origins test as a distinguishing standard.
VI. THE APPEALS COURT'S FORFEITURE PROBLEM
The Seventh Circuit, unlike the Tax Court, found no need to
address the difficulties inherent in the origins test. Whether the possi-
ble forfeiture of the certificates of deposit was an origin or a conse-
quence of the legal expenses did not matter to the Seventh Circuit
because "forfeiture of these certificates of deposit was not even a con-
sequence of a successful RICO claim" against Accardo. 1'9 The Sev-
enth Circuit relied on the Tax Court's unsupported assertion that
Accardo did not obtain the funds used to purchase his certificates of
deposit from the alleged racketeering activities for which he was
indicted. 120  Therefore, the certificates represented no interest
acquired or maintained in violation of the RICO Act. Hence, the for-
feiture provision of that Act did not encompass the certificates of
deposit. 121
The Tax Court had not reached that conclusion; indeed, the Tax
Court specifically stated that forfeiture of the certificates of deposit
was a possible consequence of a guilty verdict. 122 Interestingly, the
Seventh Circuit's opinion claims that "[tlhe non-forfeitability of the
certificates of deposit represents an argument that has been over-
looked by both sides in this appeal."' 23 The Seventh Circuit appar-
ently believed the government's failure to mention the non-
forfeitability of the certificates to be either an inadvertent or a care-
fully planned omission. In reality, however, both Accardo and the
government likely believed that the certificates were forfeitable; as
case law has shown, they probably were.
"[T]he RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its eco-
nomic roots."' 24 "[T]he forfeiture provision was intended to serve all
the aims of RICO. . . 'to punish, deter, incapacitate, and ... directly
to remove the corrupting influence from the channels of com-
merce.' "125 RICO provides a remedy of immensely broad scope, and
119. Id. at 449.
120. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96, 99 (1990).
121. Accardo, 942 F.2d at 448.
122. Accardo, 94 T.C. at 100.
123. Accardo, 942 F.2d at 447.
124. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
125. Id. at 27-28 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,955 (1970)).
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RICO forfeiture is broadly imposed.
Although under other federal statutes a forfeiture proceeding is
in rem against the property, under RICO the forfeiture is in personam
against the defendant and is part of the punishment for the crime. 12 6
"Since RICO forfeiture is a sanction against the individual defendant
rather than a judgment against the property, 'it follows the
defendant.... 127
The original posture of the Seventh Circuit as to RICO forfeiture
was that if a defendant had spent all of her forfeitable assets by the
time the verdict was rendered, there was nothing left for the defend-
ant to forfeit.' 28 However, after an Eleventh Circuit decision holding
that the government did not have to trace money received by defend-
ants as kickbacks in connection with real estate transactions, 129 the
Seventh Circuit overruled its earlier position, concluding that the gov-
ernment is not required to trace the path of the illegal proceeds to
identifiable assets to satisfy the forfeiture. 130 "It ... does not matter
whether the government recovers the identical dollars that the
defendant received in violation of section 1962, as long as the amount
that the defendant acquired in violation of the statute is known."''
In Accardo's case, the indictment alleged that the interests of the
defendants subject to forfeiture included any and all proceeds of the
alleged racketeering activity and any and all interests, securities,
claims, and property and contractual rights acquired through the use
of these proceeds. 132 According to the indictment, those proceeds
included $2,064,066.32 paid and received as kickbacks. 133 Because
the amount the defendants acquired in violation of the RICO statute
was known, it did not matter whether the government recovered the
actual $2,064,066.32 received as kickbacks. What mattered was that
the defendants, if found guilty, had to forfeit $2,064,066.32 to the gov-
126. United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 801.
128. See United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1984).
129. United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir. 1985).
130. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 801; see also ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING
SECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 99 (2d ed. 1988).
131. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 801. After Ginsburg was decided, the RICO statute was
amended to provide that if any property acquired in violation of § 1962 cannot be located, or
has been transferred, sold, placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, substantially diminished
in value, or commingled with other property, "the court shall order forfeiture of any other
property of the defendant up to the value to the property" originally sought to be forfeited. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
132. Indictment at 18, United States v. Accardo, No. 81-230-CR-ALH (S.D. Fla. filed June
3, 1981).
133. Id.
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ernment. If Accardo had been among those found guilty, he would
have to forfeit some or all of the specified amount-and if his contri-
bution came from cashing in his certificates of deposit, so be it.
It is important to keep in mind that the indictment alleged that
the defendants were jointly and severally liable to the United States
for the forfeiture. 34  When Accardo's convicted co-defendants
appealed their convictions, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the ques-
tion whether a RICO forfeiture could be imposed jointly and severally
was an issue of first impression.1 35 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
although joint and several liability had never been imposed before in a
criminal case, the nature of a RICO conspiracy violation and the leg-
islative history of the RICO forfeiture provision indicated that joint
and several liability was not only consistent with the purpose of RICO
forfeiture, but in some cases might be necessary to achieve the aims of
the legislation. 36
According to the Eleventh Circuit, if the government could
prove the amount of the proceeds (as it did here) and identify a finite
group of people receiving the proceeds (as it also did here), it would
defeat the purpose of RICO to hold that the proceeds could not be
forfeited just because the government could not prove which specific
defendant received how much of the money. 37 There was no ques-
tion that the monies paid to the corporations in Accardo's case were
forfeitable proceeds; the Eleventh Circuit held that in this context,
joint and several liability was simply a collection device.'3 8
To the extent that tracing of forfeitable property among defend-
ants is impossible, forfeiture of the total amount of money or property
can be sought from each defendant. 39 A judgment against Accardo
could have been satisfied from other properties owned by him, includ-
ing the certificates of deposit. 1  Given the broad nature of RICO
forfeitures and the joint and several liability found in this case, there is
no question that, if Accardo had been found guilty, his certificates of
deposit would have been in grave jeopardy.
134. Id.
135. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1506 (11th Cir. 1986).
136. Id. at 1507.
137. Id. at 1508. Other courts have followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in permitting
joint and several liability in RICO forfeitures. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d
1362 (7th Cir. 1991); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1301 (6th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Benevento, 663 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
138. Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1508.
139. Karla R. Spaulding, "Hit Them Where It Hurts": RICO Criminal Forfeitures and
White Collar Crime, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 258 (1989).
140. See Benevento, 663 F. Supp. at 1119.
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VII. CONCLUSION
After a lifetime of staying one step ahead of the law, including
several successful encounters with the Seventh Circuit, Anthony
Accardo's luck ran out when he attempted his tax deduction for legal
expenses. There is no question that in announcing its reliance on the
origins test, the Tax Court conformed to mainstream, if not always
workable, tax law. But it cannot be denied that the origin of
Accardo's claim could differ from that found by the Tax Court, or
that the Tax Court could have thrown caution to the winds and
applied the consequences test.
The Seventh Circuit, for its part, appeared to be determined not
to let Anthony Accardo get away with anything, and it ignored
important and relevant case law on RICO forfeiture to arrive at its
conclusion. Perhaps the Seventh Circuit was expressing its frustra-
tion over the apparent inability of any court to punish Accardo for a
lifetime of crime. Perhaps the court was repulsed by Accardo's
"chutzpah" in claiming a tax deduction after having escaped a convic-
tion under the very statute enacted specifically to apprehend people
like him. Whatever its motivation, the Seventh Circuit appears to
have resolved that even though it could not find a way to impose
criminal penalties on Accardo, he was under no circumstances to
receive any favors from the court. "Big Tuna" would not swim away
a winner this time.
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